Abstract. Using two di¨erent measures of relative cohort size ± one indicating the size and placement of an individual's own birth cohort, and the other, the ratio of young to prime age adults in the United States in that year ± it has been possible to isolate strong e¨ects of the population age structure on wages in the United States over the past thirty-three years. These e¨ects have been strong enough that virtually all of the observed change in the experience premium, and a substantial proportion of the changes in the college wage premium, can be explained by the relative cohort size variables alone. Even changes in the amount of within-group variance in wages appear to be largely a function of changing age structure, and absolute wage levels have been strongly a¨ected by these demographic changes, suggesting that population growth can have positive e¨ects on the economy. JEL classi®cation: J21, J23, J31
Introduction
To what extent have the major dislocations observed in the United States youth labor market over the last 35 years ± especially declining relative and absolute wages ± been a function of changes in the age structure of the population? Studies such as Katz and Murphy (1992) , Bound and Johnson (1992) , Levy and Murnane (1992) , and Murphy and Welch (1992) all conclude that shifts in labor supply due to the baby boom and bust cannot account for the changes observed, at least since 1980: they appeal to shifts in the composition of labor demand. But to what extent have shifts in demand been a function of changing age structure in the population? The large number of studies which have attempted to measure the e¨ects of age structure on wages have assumed that these would be related only to the excess supply of labor created by large cohort size. They have ignored any potential aggregate demand e¨ects related to population growth and change.
The idea of strong aggregate demand e¨ects of population change is not new. Simon Kuznets (1958 Kuznets ( , 1961 identi®ed cycles in economic activity which induced new population growth, in the form of international migration, and were in turn reinforced by the induced investment created by that population in¯ux. Others (for example, Lo È sch 1937; Abramovitz 1961; Hall 1963; Kelley 1965 Kelley , 1968 Kelley , 1969 Ben-Porath 1997) even suggested that the initial cycles in economic activity observed by Kuznets were generated by changes in population age structure. Richard Easterlin's (1968) work on long swings in economic activity elaborated on and extended Kuznets' work, and demonstrated the substitutability between growth through international migration and indigenous fertility rates. And recent work such as Mankiw and Weil (1989) , McMillan and Baesel (1990) , and Fair and Dominguez (1991) suggests continued signi®cant e¨ects.
The work presented in this paper is based on the hypothesis that changes in domestic consumption ± and in the induced investment generated by that consumption ± have resulted from the sharp changes which have occurred in various age groups in the population in the postwar period. The passage of the baby boom, and then the baby bust, into the labor market and household formation stages was not a smooth and gradual process: it was characterized by a number of`spikes' when growth surged and then fell dramatically ± sometimes by over 15% in just a ®ve-year period. For example following its 1945±47 run-up from 85.9 to 113.3, the General Fertility Rate (GFR: the number of births per 1000 women aged 15±44 in a given year) then dropped back to about 106 for the next three years ± and in 1961 it declined from 117.1 to 90.8 in just 5 years, and then seemed to be on another upswing when in 1968±1970 it rose 6.6% ± and then dropped 16% in the next 3 years.
In a market as ®nely tuned to changes in`underlying fundamentals' as the U.S. economy, such sharp¯uctuations are likely to have caused strong ripple e¨ects through investment and consumption multipliers, as these¯uctuations passed through key age groups. The condition of the U.S. economy twenty years after any of the dates mentioned above suggests that is indeed the case. In addition, when the baby boomers were children in their parents' households they contributed to signi®cant changes in consumption as a proportion of household income, as they grew from toddlers to teenagers ± changes which contributed to the strong growth in the economy in the 1960s, but then fell od ramatically in the 1970s as the boom in children turned into a bust (Lazear
